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Abstract
Yang’s theory of economic specialization under increasing returns to scale (Yang
2001) is a formal development of the fundamental Smith-Young theorem on the
extent of the market and the social division of labor. In this theory specialization—
and, thus, the social division of labor—is ﬁrmly embedded within a system of
perfectly competitive markets. This leaves unresolved whether and how such
development processes are possible in economies based on more primitive, non-
market organizations.
In this paper we introduce a general relational model of economic interacti-
on. Within this non-market environment we discuss the emergence of economic
specialization and ultimately of economic trade and a social division of labor. We
base our approach on three stages in organizational development: the presen-
ce of a stable relational structure; the presence of relational trust and subjective
specialization; and, ﬁnally, the emergence of objective specialization through the
social recognition of subjectively deﬁned economic roles.
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Xiaokai Yang visited the Center for Economic Research at Tilburg University during
the Spring of 1999. Immediately he engaged two of the three authors in extensive
discussions on his research program. We easily identiﬁed similar research interests
and this led to some fruitful exchanges and discussions.
During Professor Yang’s visit to Tilburg we in particular discussed working paper
versions of papers that were published subsequently as Diamantaras, Gilles, and Ruys
(2003) and Sun, Yang, and Zhou (2004). These papers address some of the central
problems and theoretical questions that lie at the core of our respective research
programs. It is therefore ﬁtting that in this paper we return to these central questions
and sketch a joint research program that addresses both sets of questions.
The research program of Professor Yang was seminally developed in Yang (1988)
and subsequently brought to fruition in numerous research papers.1 The core of this
research program is the application of inframarginal analysis to the decision model
underlying a consumer-producer within a system of perfectly competitive market. In
turn, this approach is used to model the Smith-Young approach to the relationship
of specialization, the social division of labor, and increasing returns to scale. (Smith
1776, Young 1928, Stigler 1951)
Smith (1776) argued in his seminal work Wealth of Nations that the social divisi-
on of labor is limited by the extent of the market so that the beneﬁts of specialization
to an individual are determined largely by the existing social division of labor in the
economy. (This is also known as the Smithian Theorem.) Young (1928) extended this
into a synergetic argument that the extent of the market also depends upon the level
of social division of labor. Thus, the presence of increasing returns to scale leads
to specialization and further social division of labor. In turn, a high level of social
division of labor leads to increasing economies of specialization that form further
incentives to specialize and deepen the social division of labor.
In the present paper we intend to sketch an argument that extends the Smithian
theorem beyond the setting of a competitive market economy based on a system of
perfectly competitive markets. Our argument is that the Smith-Young mechanism also
applies to social organizations and institutional settings other than that of a system
of perfectly competitive markets.
Indeed, we argue that the process of specialization occurs at different levels of
embeddedness of the individual consumer-producer and that only at its most advan-
ced state—namely that of objective specialization—this process results into a social
division of labor. Thus, a social division of labor can indeed exist and generate econo-
mic development and growth in the context of more primitive economic institutions
1We refer to Yang (2001), Yang (2003) and Cheng and Yang (2004) for a comprehensive review of
the work that has been accomplished in this research program.
1and systems of imperfectly competitive markets. This development mechanism is not
based on the endogenous selection of a specialization by an individual based on the
prevailing market prices; instead, each individual selects from a given set of social
economic roles, each corresponding to some specialism. Each of these social econo-
mic roles is collectively recognized as such and, regarding each of these social roles,
there is a common knowledge.
Yang and Borland (1991) already showed that the Smith-Young mechanism functi-
ons as a determining factor in economic growth. Indeed, the mechanism of ever-
deepening economic specialization and the accompanying development of the social
division of labor leads to signiﬁcant growth. In economic history and the new insti-
tutional economics this has been accepted as the main engine behind the rise of the
western economies. (North and Thomas 1973, North 1990, Greif 1994, North 2005)
Recently, Ogilvie (2004), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) and Gref
(2006) have extended this argument and pointed to economic organizations other
than the perfectly competitive market in which the Smith-Young mechanism cau-
ses economic development and growth. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005)
mainly point to the development of property rights and the underlying political in-
stitutions as causes of economic growth. Empirical evidence of past performance of
western economies back up these arguments.
In the current paper we present a model of a rather primitive economy in which
economic agents directly interact with each other without reference to a central or-
ganization such as a system of competitive markets. Instead individual economic
agents engage in binary, value-generating relationships—or “matchings”. Matchings
have to be understood as binary productive engagements, which are not necessarily
trade relationships. It is assumed in this very primitive economy that every individual
activates exactly one value-generating matching.
Our theory is developed along two different lines of thought. The ﬁrst line is that
of a formal theory in which we develop precise mathematical deﬁnitions and show
two main theorems. The ﬁrst theorem gives conditions under which equilibrium in
a speciﬁc matching economy can be sustained; the second theorem gives a generic
existence result that supports the emergence of a social division of labor.
The second line of thought develops an application of our theory to a speciﬁc
case to illustrate the notions of subjective and objective specialization. Our main
argument is that there are two different types of stability possible within a matching
economy.
Subjective stability: Individuals engage in binary value-generating relationships—
or matchings—and stability is attained if individuals are not willing to become
autarkic or switch partners for higher beneﬁts. The presence of stability is thus
“subjective” in the sense that it is completely based on the properties of the
2productive abilities and utility functions of the individuals in the economy.
If a state of subjective stability is attained in the economy, the individuals might
develop mutually beneﬁcial trade within the relationship that they are engaged
in. Moreover, individuals might specialize their productive activities within
the (subjective) setting of the matching that they are engaged in. This is call-
ed subjective specialization since it is founded on the speciﬁc properties of the
matching in which they generate their utilities.
We emphasize that subjective specialization does not induce a social division of
labor since individuals are not engaged at a higher social plane; their economic
interaction is explicitly limited to be within their matchings only. In that regard
the organization of the economy remains scattered and there are no widespread
gains from trade.
Generic stability: Only if generic stability is feasible, economic agents can truly spe-
cialize in an objective fashion and there emerges a social division of labor. A
matching economy attains generic stability if for every proﬁle of utility functions
and production sets, there exists a stable matching pattern. Our main theorem
states that such generic stability is attained if there is a social organization
of the economy based on at least two socially recognized roles. Hence, there
exist two socio-economic roles and value-generating relationships solely exist
between individuals with different social roles. Only after the social roles of
hunter and gatherer are established, a true endogenous social division of labor
can emerge in which individuals specialize either as a hunter or a gatherer.
Our main existence theorem on generic stability thus identiﬁes that a binary
social division of labor is a pre-requisite for stability. This amends the Smithian
theorem in the sense that there has to exist a ﬁnite set of socio-economic roles
into which individuals can specialize, to establish stability in the social organi-
zation of the economy. The emergence of a set of socially recognized roles is,
thus, a necessary condition for stability in the economy.
Hence, economic prosperity is determined largely by the set of available so-
cial roles in the economy. The Smith-Young mechanism of economic devel-
opment can now be linked to the development of this set of socially recogni-
zed roles; innovation in social organization—in the sense that new social roles
are developed—now determines the extent of the market and, thus, economic
growth.
Although our model of a matching economy describes a very primitive society, we
believe that it makes possible some deep conclusions. We believe that our approach
also resolves the indeterminacy problem identiﬁed by Gilles and Diamantaras (2005).
They argued that the theory of the Smith-Young development mechanism is founded
on a circular argument: prices of traded goods determine individuals’ specialization
3and, thus, prices determine the social division of labor. This, in turn, determines
which goods are produced and traded, thus determining the extent of the market.
This brings up the question who or what ultimately determines which goods are
traded and how economic development is accomplished.
In our current model we put this determinacy problem at the center of our ana-
lysis. Indeed, our main result states that generic stability requires the existence of a
certain set of established social roles from which individuals can choose when they
specialize. Each social role stands for a certain social-economic specialization and in
equilibrium the number of agents of each role is balanced. Only then an effective
social division of labor emerges and the society can engage into an effective process
of economic development and growth. Ultimately this development is founded on
the enhancement and extension of the commonly known set of economic roles.
Ultimately we conclude that economic development and growth is caused by or-
ganizational and institutional change (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005), ra-
ther than technical change only (Romer 1986, Romer 1990). We believe that techni-
cal change is a consequence and expression of the effectiveness of the social organi-
zation of the economy.
In Section 2 we develop our model of a matching economy based on binary value-
generating activities among economic agents. In Section 3 we deﬁne stability as our
main equilibrium notion and develop the application to a primitive hunter-gatherer
economy. Section 4 discusses the existence of stable matching patterns and the emer-
gence of subjective specialization. In Section 5 we introduce generic stability and
the possibility of objective specialization. This in turn implies the emergence of a
social division of labor in such a matching economy. We summarize our main line of
thought in Section 6.
2 Matching economies
Let N = f1;:::;ng be a ﬁnite set of individuals. At this stage we do not make any
assumptions about these individuals regarding their individual abilities. Hence, in
this general model we do not explicitly assume that these individuals are consumer-
producers or that they are even able to specialize in any form.
Instead we endow these individuals with the abilities to engage into relational
economic activities that generate economic values or wealth.2 Therefore, these in-
dividuals are assumed to have relational abilities. (These relational abilities have to
be understood as special forms of more generalized social-economic abilities.) These
relational abilities in turn might be based on individualistic abilities; this approach
2The most primitive form of a matching is that of cooperation in some production activities. More
advanced forms include the simple exchange or trade of two commodities. The gains from trade then
form the values that are generated between the two traders.
4is explored in some examples throughout this paper. Note that we do not assume or
impose that these relational activities take place in the context of a market. Instead
we assume that these relational abilities describe the economy itself.
Formally, we let ¡ ½ fij j i;j 2 Ng be a set of potential relational activities between
the individuals in N. Here, for two distinct individuals i 2 N and j 2 N with i 6= j we
deﬁne by ij 2 ¡ that these individuals i and j are able to engage in a “value-generating
relational activity”. We indicate this potential relational engagement ij 2 ¡ as a
potential matching of i and j. This is formalized as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A potential matching structure on the set of individuals N is given as
¡ ½ fij j i;j 2 Ng such that
(i) for every individual i 2 N: ii 2 ¡ and
(ii) for every individual i 2 N there exists some j 2 N with j 6= i and ij 2 ¡.
Every relationship ij in the structure ¡ on N is denoted as a potential matching.
We emphasize that any potential matching is symmetric in the sense that a matching
between individuals i and j is exactly the same matching as the one between indivi-
duals j and i. On the other hand, individuals i and j need not have the same utility
from this potential matching, as it will become evident later.
It is also possible that an individual i 2 N does not engage in an economic activity
with any of the other economic individuals. In this regard i attains a relationally
autarkic position.3 Mathematically this is represented by the pairing of i with himself,
i.e., by the matching ii. The deﬁnition of ¡ assumes that each player i 2 N has
the possibility to exclude himself from the relational activities in this economy and
assume a relationally autarkic position, indicated by ii 2 ¡. We deﬁne
¡0 = fii j i 2 Ng ½ ¡
as the collection of relationally autarkic positions.
Another interpretation is that the potential matching structure ¡ represents the
social capital that is present within the population N. It describes what is the po-
tential set of matching partners for each individual, i.e., the complete description of
her potential social interactions. Some of these potential interactions may generate
positive utilities and others negative. Most importantly, it is assumed that no two
individuals i and j with ij = 2 ¡ can even engage in an economic value-generating
relation. This indeed corresponds to the notion of social capital as used in the social
sciences. (Por 1998, Putnam 2000, Dasgupta 2005)
3Throughout the paper we distinguish two types of autarky: relational autarky and trade autarky.
Relational autarky refers to the state of isolation of a player within the structure of all potential relations
¡, while trade autarky refers to a state of nonparticipation in any of the trade processes in the economy.
Obviously, relational autarky implies trade autarky.
5The relative position of an individual in ¡ deﬁnes his matching possibility set as it
will become clear in the analysis. Formally, for every potential matching structure ¡
and every individual i 2 N, we introduce i’s neighborhood in ¡ as the set of individuals
who can be partners of player i in potential matchings, i.e.,
Ni(¡) = fj 2 N j ij 2 ¡ with i 6= jg:
The set of potential matchings that individual i can engage in, can now be formulated
as
Li(¡) = fij 2 ¡ j j 2 Ni(¡)g:
Let m 2 N. A path between individuals i and j in the potential matching structure
¡ is a set of distinct individuals P(ij) = fi1;i2;:::;img ½ N such that i1 = i, im = j
and ikik+1 2 ¡ for all k 2 f1;:::;m - 1g. The length of the path P(ij) is said to be the
number of links m - 1 that make up this path.
A cycle in the structure ¡ is a set of distinct players C = fi1;i2;:::;img with m > 4
such that i1 = im and ikik+1 2 ¡ for all k 2 f1;:::;m - 1g. Now the length of the
cycle C is given as m - 1. Thus, a cycle is a path from an individual to herself, which
consists of at least three distinct players. We emphasize that each cycle has length of
at least three, i.e., a cycle consists of at least three distinct relations.
Deﬁnition 2.2 We say that a sub-structure ­ ½ ¡ of the potential matching structure
¡ on N is odd acyclic if ­ does not contain any cycle C of length ` > 3 such that ` is an
odd integer.
Odd acyclicity turns out to be a crucial property in the further development of our
theory.
To complete our model we assume that every individual i 2 N is endowed with
complete and transitive preferences over the potential matchings Li(¡) ½ ¡ in which
she can engage in. Thus, by ﬁniteness of ¡, these preferences can be represented
by a hedonic utility function given by ui: Li(¡) ! R. Let u = (u1;:::;un) denote a
hedonic utility proﬁle and U be the set of all hedonic proﬁles representing complete
and transitive preferences.
Deﬁnition 2.3 A matching economy is deﬁned to be a triple E = (N;¡;u) in which N
is a ﬁnite set of individuals, ¡ is a potential matching structure on N, and u 2 U is a
hedonic utility proﬁle on ¡.
A matching economy essentially is based on potential binary activities that gene-
rate economic values. For example, a trade economy can be represented as a mat-
ching economy between buyers and sellers who can trade physical goods to generate
gains from trade. We emphasize here that a trade economy with two commodities—
one desirable and money—imposes that the potential matching structure ¡ is bipartite
6and that there are in fact two social types of individuals, namely buyers of the desira-
ble and sellers of the desirable. This in turn implies that ¡ is odd-acyclic. This imposes
very strong properties on the matching economy as we explore in subsequent sections
of this paper.
Similarly, as an application to the health sector of an economy, by performing
surgery on a patient a physician generates a signiﬁcant increase of the life expectancy
of that patient, thus generating a social value. There can also be examples when the
roles are not speciﬁed such as pairing students to work on a class project.
3 Relational stability and equilibrium
Within the context of a matching economy we investigate the proper deﬁnition of
stability. A stable interaction pattern is crucial to further develop our theory. Stability
is a necessary condition for the further development of an economy, in particular for
the emergence of specialization and a social division of labor.
Our main hypothesis in our deﬁnition of stability is that in a matching economy
E = (N;¡;u) each individual activates exactly one of her potential matchings. This
fundamental hypothesis is founded on the fact that we model a very primitive eco-
nomy without the presence of advanced economic or social institutions. In such a
primitive economy it is natural to assume that individuals only interact with a single
other individual at a time and that more complex interactions require more advanced
social institutions than assumed within our context.
Within the conﬁnes of the constraints imposed on the potential economic activi-
ties of the individuals in the economy E we now deﬁne a matching pattern as a set
of activated potential matchings.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A matching pattern is a subset of the potential matching structure
¼ ½ ¡ such that every individual is either paired with exactly one other individual or
remains relationally autarkic, i.e., ¼ ½ ¡ is such that jLi(¼)j = jNi(¼)j = 1, for all
i 2 N.
We denote by ¦(¡) = ¦ the class of all potential matching patterns within ¡.
In a matching pattern one and only one matching is selected and executed by each
individual. For ease of notation we denote the utility an individual i has when parti-
cipating in a matching pattern ¼ in which Li(¼) = fii¼g as ui(¼), i.e., ui(¼) ´ ui(ii¼),
for all i 2 N.4
With the tools developed so far we are able to introduce two relational stability con-
cepts. Again we let the matching economy E = (N;¡;u) be given throughout. For
4We emphasize that the hedonic utility proﬁle considered here allows an individual to consider only
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Figure 1: The potential matching structure G in Example 3.3.
matching pattern ¼ 2 ¦, a potential matching ij 2 ¡ n ¼ is a blocking matching if
ui(ij) > ui(¼) as well as uj(ij) > uj(¼).
Having deﬁned a blocking matching as a strict binary Pareto improvement, we
follow the concepts used in the literature on matching (Roth and Sotomayor 1990).
We point out that our notion of stability is closely related to that of stability in net-
work formation (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996). With this concept we can deﬁne our
stability property of a matching pattern.
Deﬁnition 3.2 A matching pattern ¼ 2 ¦ is stable in the economy E = (N;¡;u) if all
matchings in ¼ satisfy the individual rationality (IR) and no blocking (NB) conditi-
ons:
IR ui(¼) > ui(ii) for all i 2 N, and
NB there is no blocking matching with regard to ¼, i.e., for all i;j 2 N, i 6= j, with
ij 2 ¡ n ¼:
ui(ij) > ui(¼) implies that uj(ij) 6 uj(¼): (1)
Stable matching patterns in E are denoted by ¼ 2 ¦?(N;¡;u).
Condition (IR) is an individual rationality requirement, that states that an individual
cannot be matched with another individual without her consent, i.e., if an individual
is better-off under relational autarky, she will pursue that.
In (NB) stands for a non-blocking condition requiring that a blocking matching
does not exist with respect to matching pattern ¼ 2 ¦. Under (NB) if an individual
prefers to be matched with an alternative individual than the one with whom he is
matched under matching pattern ¼, then that alternative individual does not agree
to engage with him. This condition is closely related to the condition of link addition
proofness in network formation. Link addition proofness is at the foundation of the
notion of pairwise stability in network formation, seminally introduced by Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996).
To illustrate our deﬁnition of stability, we discuss an abstract example.
8Example 3.3 Consider an economy E1 = (N;¡;u) with N = f1;2;3;4g, potential
matching structure ¡ = f12;23;13;14;11;22;33;44g, and the utility proﬁle u given in
the table below.5
j = 1 2 3 4
u1(1j) 0 1 2 3
u2(2j) 1 0 2 –
u3(3j) 2 -1 0 –
u4(4j) 0 – – 1
Given ¡ we now derive the collection of all possible matching patterns, which is given
by
¦ = ff11;22;33;44g; f11;23;44g; f12;33;44g; f13;22;44g; f23;14gg:
We now identify the stable matching patterns in this example. Let us start the dis-
cussion with individual 1. She prefers to be matched to individual 4 since her utility
in this matching is the highest. However, individual 4 prefers to be by herself rather
than to be matched with 1 (u4(14) < u4(44)). Hence a matching between individuals
1 and 4 violates the individual rationality condition for individual 4.
Excluding link 14, individual 1 prefers to be matched with individual 3. Since indivi-
dual 1 is also individual 3’s most preferred partner, a matching between them cannot
be blocked by individual 2. Finally, individuals 2 and 4 do not have a potential mat-
ching, hence in the matching pattern they should be in a state of relational autarky.
Therefore, the unique stable matching pattern is given by ¼¤ = f13;22;44g. ¤
Our main application of the general relational framework developed is that of a re-
lational economy of consumer-producers. We follow the new classical framework
developed in Yang (2001) and Yang (2003). The new classical approach is ﬁrmly
founded on the premise that consumer-producers specialize within a social context
of a structure of (market) interactions and, thus, attain higher welfare levels.
Here we start at an even more primitive level of reasoning. Before there is actual
specialization, there are consumer-producers with simple skills on which these spe-
cializations can be based. We recognize that skills, unlike commodities, are intrinsic
to a consumer-producer and cannot be exchanged. They can, however, be shared.
Sharing one’s skills with another individual is a process that does not make the giver
any poorer in the skill.6 As established by Yang and Borland (1991) and Yang (2003),
learning-by-doing is an important mechanism in the process of growth. However, in
Yang’s framework this process is individual-speciﬁc, i.e., economic individuals are not
allowed to learn from each other. In our framework, we go beyond this restriction
5In this table a dash in a cell indicates that no potential matching between individuals i and j exists.
6A commodity, in comparison, if shared makes the giver poorer in the possession of that commodity.
This is to say that while commodities are pure private goods, skills are non-rival in nature.
9by allowing limited learning between individuals. When two individuals engage in a
relational activity, they do not actually exchange consumption goods, as in the case
of Yang; instead their learning externalities increase their productivity through the
(limited) sharing of the skills accumulated by their partners.
These ideas are illustrated in Example 3.4 below. There is a ﬁnite set of consumer-
producers. Each individual is endowed with one unit of productive time. There are
two types of skills, hunting (H) and gathering (G), complementing the production of
two types of consumption goods, meat and vegetables such as roots and corn. When
individuals are engaged in a matching they acquire also some of the skills acquired
by their partner. Thus, there are relational externalities in the acquisition of skills.
Individuals principally engage in the individual accumulation of hunting and ga-
thering skills. We also implement that they can decide to match with another indivi-
dual and enjoy the relational externalities in the acquisition of skills with this other
individual; skills are actually shared. This sharing is based on some learning process
between the matched individuals. Within such a “sharing” matching, each individual
produces meat and vegetables by hunting and gathering, respectively. Before making
a decision to match, each individual can calculate the potential production and level
of utility attainable in each potential matching.
At this point in the development of a society, it is not assumed that matched
individuals actually engage in the exchange of the produced goods if this is beneﬁcial
for both parties. Instead they remain trade autarkic7 and only share their skills in the
way described above.
Example 3.4 (A relational economy with consumer-producers)
Let N = f1;2;3g be the set of three individuals. Each individual is endowed with one
unit of time which she can use to acquire gathering skills Gi and hunting skills Hi.
Skill acquisition is linear in time, i.e., Gi = li and Hi = 1 - li where li 2 [0;1] is the
labor time used by individual i in acquiring gathering skills Gi. Each individual i is
therefore endowed with a technology to produce two types of consumption goods:
vegetables (v) and meat (m) by using gathering skills Gi and hunting skills Hi, res-
pectively.
Furthermore, the interaction between these individuals is introduced as a comple-
mentarity in skill acquisition; individuals can acquire some of the skills of their mat-
ching partner. This is described by two learning parameters ®i
ij;¯i
ij 2 [0;1], which are
individual and pair speciﬁc. The parameters ® (respectively ¯) describe the transfer
of gathering (respectively hunting) skills from an individual’s partner to that indivi-
7As introduced before, we use the term “trade autarkic” to express that an individual is self-sufﬁcient
without engaging in trade to obtain certain commodities.
10dual. The corresponding production functions are now introduced as
gi(ij) = (Gi(1 + ®i
ijGj))2 and
hi(ij) = (Hi(1 + ¯i
ijHj))2 for all i;j = 1;2;3:









11 0 0 — —
12 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.6
13 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.3
22 0 0 — —
23 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.5
33 0 0 — —
Individuals are endowed with homothetic preferences over the consumption of meat




where vi denotes the consumption of vegetables by individual i and mi denotes the
consumption of meat by individual i.
The optimal acquisition of skills
The optimal investment in hunting and gathering skill of each individual depends on
the specialization decisions made by other individuals. First, we consider the case
in which individuals maximize their utility in the relationally autarkic case.8 The
relationally autarkic utility maximization problem is given by
max
06li61
ui(vi(li)mi(li)) = li(1 - li) for all i = 1;2;3:
The solution yields li = 1
2 for all individuals i = 1;2;3. Hence, they invest equally in
acquiring gathering and hunting skills, i.e., Gi = Hi = 1
2.
Second, given the externality parameters ® and ¯, we can calculate the optimal in-
vestment of an individual in acquiring hunting and gathering skills given the skill
levels of her partner. To take a generic case, let the partner j of individual i have
acquired skill levels Hj and Gj respectively. Then the utility maximization problem of














8This captures the extremely pessimistic case in which individuals believe that they cannot match
to any other individual. This can also be considered to be the outcome of the maximization problem
of extremely risk-averse individuals, or individuals who have very low degree of trust in the abilities of
the other individuals.
11Irrespective of the parameter values ®i
ij and ¯i
ij and of the levels Hj and Gj, this redu-
ces to the same optimization problem as under relational autarky. Thus, individuals
remain trade autarkic irrespective of the complementarities in the relationships with
their partners. So, again the optimal investment in acquisition of skills is given by
li = 1
2 implying that Hi = Gi = 1
2.
The resulting matching economy
Given the optimal acquisition of skills, we ﬁrst compute the optimal production out-
puts for vegetables and meat for all potential relationships. Subsequently, we deter-
mine the resulting potential utility values.
In fact, given Hi = Gi = 1
2 for all individuals i = 1;2;3, the potential production
levels of meat and vegetables by each individual in each possible matching are now
given by
ij gi(ij) hi(ij) gj(ij) hj(ij)
11 0.25 0.25 — —
12 0.3306 0.3306 0.4225 0.4225
13 0.3906 0.49 0.3306 0.3306
22 0.25 0.25 — —
23 0.3306 0.3306 0.49 0.3906
33 0.25 0.25 — —
We emphasize again that, since all individuals remain trade autarkic, no trade will
ensue. Moreover, note that there is no mutually beneﬁcial trade between any two
individuals because in any pair one of the individuals has bigger quantities of both
goods. In fact, we assume that all individuals believe that they will not engage in
trade after creating a relationship with another individual.9 Hence, we can calcu-
late the utilities proﬁle in a straightforward way, e.g., u1(13) =
p
g1(13) ¢ h1(13) =
p
0:3906 £ 0:49 = 0:4375. Similarly, the remainder of all utility proﬁles is computed
and presented in the table below.
j 1 2 3
u1(1j) 0.25 0.3306 0.4375
u2(2j) 0.4225 0.25 0.3306
u3(3j) 0.3306 0.4375 0.25
.
The absence of stability
We claim that in the resulting matching economy, there does not exist a stable mat-
ching pattern. Hence, in this economy based on the acquisition of complementing
skills, there does not exist an equilibrium.
9As argued in the introduction, trade can only emerge within stable relations. Thus, only within a
stable matching pattern such trade can evolve. We also refer to Examples 4.7 and 4.8 for further details.
12As the utility proﬁle shows, individual 1 prefers to be matched with individual 3 ra-
ther than with individual 2. Individual 2 prefers to be matched with individual 1
rather than with individual 3. Individual 3 prefers to be matched with individual 2
rather than with individual 1. Finally, all individuals prefer to be matched with a
partner rather than to stay relationally autarkic. Hence, we conclude that there is no
stable matching pattern. ¤
4 Existence of stability and subjective specialization
In the previous discussion, we have shown that in a primitive economy with limited
specialization, there might be no equilibrium emerging in the form of a stable mat-
ching pattern. Here we investigate the sufﬁcient conditions for the existence of stable
matching patterns. We also discuss the implications of our ﬁndings with regard to
specialization in a relational economy.
Our analysis requires the introduction of several auxiliary notions. We deﬁne for








where ¡0 = fii j i 2 Ng ½ ¡ denotes the set of relationally autarkic relationships.
Below we deﬁne a speciﬁc subclass of matching patterns. A similar class of mat-
chings has been deﬁned by Sotomayor (1996) in her proof of existence of stable mat-
ching patterns in a bipartite matching economy. (Sotomayor refers to these patterns
as “simple”; we do not adopt this terminology.)
Deﬁnition 4.1 A matching pattern ¼ 2 ¦ is weakly stable in E = (N;¡;u) if for all
individuals the Individually Rationality (IR) condition holds and whenever a blocking
matching ij 2 ¡ n ¼ exists, at least one of the partners in ij is relationally autarkic
under ¼, i.e.,
ui(ij) > ui(¼) and uj(ij) > uj(¼) imply that fii;jjg \ ¼ 6= ?: (5)
We denote this as ¼ 2 ¦w(N;¡;u) = ¦w ½ ¦.
In a weakly stable matching pattern at least one of the partners in a blocking mat-
ching is autarkic, hence if we are to delete all the relationally autarkic individuals
from such a pattern the remaining matchings will be stable. Further, note that the
set of weakly stable matching patterns ¦w is non-empty as it contains at least the
autarkic matching pattern ¡0 = fii j i 2 Ng ½ ¡. We use these properties of ¦w to
show the existence of stable matching patterns.
We ﬁrst establish the following trivial insight, which follows immediately from
Deﬁnitions 3.2 and 4.1.
13Lemma 4.2 Every stable matching pattern is also weakly stable.










Similar to the odd acyclicity property of the set of potential matchings, we deﬁne odd
acyclicity property of a matching economy E.
Deﬁnition 4.3 A matching economy E = (N;¡;u) is odd acyclic if for the class of
weakly stable matching patterns ¦w(N;¡;u) it holds that its cover ¦w ½ ¡ deﬁned in
equation (6) is odd acyclic.
We ﬁrst show that it is possible that the class of all permissible matching patterns ¦
is not odd acyclic—and, thus, ¦ ´ [¼2¦ (¼ n ¡0 ) = ¡ n ¡0 contains a cycle of odd
length—while the economy E itself is odd acyclic.
Example 4.4 Consider the matching economy E1 given in Example 3.3. Now in E1
the cover ¦ of the collection of possible matching patterns consists of a cycle with
odd number of links, between individuals 1, 2, and 3. Indeed, f12;23;31g ½ ¦ =
f12;13;14;23g.
On the other hand, given the utility proﬁle u, the set of weakly stable matching
patterns ¦w is given by
¦w = ff11;22;33;44g; f12;33;44g; f13;22;44gg:
We now see that E1 is odd acyclic. Indeed, ¦w = f12;13g and therefore does not
contain a cycle. ¤
Our main existence theorem states that stable matching patterns exist if the collection
of weakly stable matching patterns satisfy the odd acyclicity condition. We refer
to Chung (2000, Theorem 1) for a similar result for the case of a pure matching
problem.10
Theorem 4.5 If a matching economy E = (N;¡;u) is odd acyclic, then it holds that
¦?(N;¡;u) 6= ?.
Proof. First, we consider the case that the cover of the collection of weakly stable
matching patterns ¦w does not contain any cycle. Subsequently, we investigate the
case that ¦w only contains cycles that have an even number of links.
A: ¦w IS ACYCLIC.
10In his stability result Chung (2000) imposes the odd-acyclicity condition on the preference proﬁle
of the agents.
14Assume that ¦w does not contain any cycle, and suppose that no stable matching pat-
tern exists. Then for any weakly stable matching pattern ¼ 2 ¦w there is a blocking
matching. By deﬁnition of a weakly stable matching pattern in such a blocking mat-
ching at least one of the individuals is relationally autarkic under ¼. Hence, without
loss of generality, we can take a weakly stable pattern ¼ 2 ¦w for which ij is a bloc-
king matching, ii;jk 2 ¼, and there is a match of i with j leaving k alone and keeping
all other matchings the same. Matching pattern ¼0, obtained in this way, must be
weakly stable, i.e., ¼0 2 ¦w since there can be only one new blocking matching and
it contains individual k, who is relationally autarkic under ¼0.
Since ¼0 is not stable, individual k can form a blocking matching with another indi-
vidual, say l, such that lk = 2 ¼0. By forming the pair kl, a new matching pattern is
formed ¼00 = ¼0 [ fklg 2 ¦w. Note that l 6= i since ¦w does not contain a cycle. Now
the matching pattern ¼00 can in turn be blocked by a matching ps where ps = 2 ¼00.
Thus, a new matching pattern ¼000 = ¼00 [ fpsg 2 ¦w is generated where p 6= j, since
¦w does not contain a cycle.
Iterating a sequence of matching patterns ¼(k) with k 2 N according to the construc-
tion outlined above, we reach a contradiction to the acyclicity due to the ﬁniteness
of the number of individuals.
B: ¦w IS CYCLIC AS WELL AS ODD ACYCLIC.
Next we assume that ¦w is odd acyclic. Let ¦w consist of a single cycle, i.e., ¦w =
fi1i2;i2i3;:::;ik-1ikg such that ik = i1, k > 3, and k - 1 is an even integer.
We consider two cases, distinguished by the preference proﬁle of the individuals. In
the ﬁrst case the proof of the existence of a stable matching pattern is reduced to
the analysis of an acyclic cover of the collection of weakly stable matching patterns.
In the second case we propose an algorithm and prove that it leads to identifying a
stable matching pattern.
Case I: ¦w = fi1i2;i2i3;:::;ik-1ikg, ik = i1, k > 3, and k-1 is an even integer and let
there be at least one pair ij 2 ¦w, such that individual i is in the set of most prefer-
red partners of individual j and individual j is in the set of most preferred partners of
individual i, i.e., j 2 Bi(¡) ´ fk 2 Ni(¡) [ fig j ui(ik) > ui(ih) for all h 2 Ni(¡) [ figg
and i 2 Bj(¡). Note that individual i is not necessarily different from individual j.
However, if i = j, then the set of individual i’s most preferred partner must contain
also his two neighbors along a cycle.
Then it follows that ij is an element of any stable matching pattern, otherwise it will
form a blocking matching. Next consider the set of weakly stable matching patterns
which does not contain the pair ij. Thus truncated, the cover of the class of weakly
stable matching patterns, ¦w n ij, is acyclic and the existence of a stable matching
pattern, ¼?, follows from discussion of the ﬁrst part of the proof.
Case II: Assume that ¦w = fi1i2;i2i3;:::;ik-1ikg, ik = i1, such that there is no mat-
15ching ij for which j 2 Bi(¡) and i 2 Bj(¡). Note that this precludes any of the
individuals from having relational autarky as the most preferred state.
Without loss of generality consider a preference proﬁle u = (ui1;:::;uik-1) such that
uis(isis+1) > uis(is-1is), for all s = 1;:::;k - 1 where i0 = ik-1. Consider the
following algorithm for selecting a matching pattern:
Take any individual is 2 f1;:::;k - 1g and match her with her most pre-
ferred partner, Bis = is+1, hence isis+1 2 ¼;
Then consider the most preferred partner of individual is+1 and match
him with his most preferred partner, i.e., Bis+1 is is+2, and Bis+2 = is+3,
therefore is+2is+3 2 ¼;
Continue until all individuals are matched in ¼. Note that all individuals
in ¼ are in a matching with another individual, thus, ¼ 2 ¦w if and only
if ¼ is stable.
Now, suppose that ¼ is not a stable matching pattern. Then there exists a blocking
matching isis+1 for s = 1;:::;k-1 such that uis(isis+1) > uis(¼) and uis+1(isis+1) >
uis+1(¼), which contradicts the construction of ¼ in which one of every two consecu-
tive individuals is matched with her most preferred partner in ¼. Thus, ¼ 2 ¦w is a
stable matching pattern.
In fact in the last case of the proof of Theorem 4.5 there are two distinct stable
matching patterns. One is selected if the starting individual in the algorithm has an
odd index on the cyclical path. The other stable matching pattern is selected if the
starting individual in the algorithm has an even index on the cyclical path
The reverse of Theorem 4.5 is not necessarily true, i.e., if a stable matching pat-
tern exists with respect to some ¡ ½ ¡N then it might be that ¦w contains a cycle of
odd length. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 4.6 Consider again the matching economy E1 as discussed in Example 3.3
with the potential matching structure depicted in Figure 1. Now we modify the utility
proﬁles over potential matchings as follows:
j 1 2 3 4
u1(1j) 0 1 2 3
u2(2j) 1 0 2 –
u3(3j) 2 1 0 –
u4(4j) 0 – – 1
In this modiﬁed matching economy E2 there exists a unique stable matching pattern
¼? = f13;22;44g.11 However, the cover of the set of simple matching patterns, ¦w,
11We refer the reader to the discussion of Example 3.3 to see why this is a stable matching pattern.
16generates a cycle. Indeed,
¦w = ff11;22;33;44g; f13;22;44g; f11;23;44g; f12;33;44gg; (7)
and therefore ¦w = f12;13;23g is an odd cycle itself. ¤
4.1 The development of trade
In Example 3.4 we showed that there might not exist stable matching patterns in re-
lational settings with complementarities in skill acquisition. In such a matching eco-
nomy, all individuals could establish mutually beneﬁcial relationships with another
individual based on relational complementarities in the acquisition of skills. Howe-
ver, in that example, the lack of mutual consent of most preferred partners precludes
them from establishing these relationships. The absence of a stable matching pattern
implies that there is essentially a state of chaos in such a society.
The next example extends the discussion in Example 3.4 and shows that in many
cases there might emerge stable matching patterns within such situations. It develops
a case of an economy in which the learning parameters allow the formation of a stable
matching pattern consisting of mutually beneﬁcial relationships.
Example 4.7 ( Existence of stable matching patterns)
Consider the matching economy that has been developed in Example 3.4. We modify
this example to allow the existence of a stable matching pattern. For this we modify








11 0 0 — —
12 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.6
13 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.5
22 0 0 — —
23 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
33 0 0 — —
As in Example 3.4 individuals remain trade autarkic under the given circumstances
and have an optimal investment in the acquisition of skills given by li = 1
2. Hence, all
individuals i 2 f1;2;3g attain skill levels Gi = Hi = 1
2. This results into the following
production levels:
ij gi(ij) hi(ij) gj(ij) hj(ij)
11 0.25 0.25 — —
12 0.3306 0.3306 0.4225 0.4225
13 0.3906 0.49 0.49 0.3906
22 0.25 0.25 — —
23 0.3306 0.3306 0.3306 0.3306
33 0.25 0.25 — —
17These production levels now result into the following potential utility levels:
j 1 2 3
u1(1j) 0.25 0.3306 0.4375
u2(2j) 0.4225 0.25 0.3306
u3(3j) 0.4375 0.3306 0.25
.
It is clear that for the given potential utility levels there exists a stable matching
pattern. Indeed, the generated matching economy is odd acyclic and the pattern
¼¤ = f13;22g is stable. This stable matching pattern results into utility levels given by
u¤
1 = u¤
3 = 0:4375 and u¤
2 = 0:25. ¤
Only after stable matchings have been formed, individuals can engage in mutually
beneﬁcial trade within such relationships. Without the support of a stable relati-
onship, there would neither exist nor emerge any trust among the individuals and
therefore there would be no institutional basis for trade.
However, within a stable matching, trade is founded on a moderate level of trust
and both individuals can be assumed to engage in trade. This is the subject of the
next extension of Example 4.7:
Example 4.8 (Justiﬁcation of trade)
Consider the matching economy discussed in Example 4.7. This matching economy
admits a stable matching pattern ¼¤ = f13;22g. The only relevant stable matching
that emerges within this pattern is 13. Both individuals 1 and 3 can indeed engage in
mutually beneﬁcial trade within this relationship.
Note that within 13, g1 = 0:3906, h1 = 0:49, g3 = 0:49, and h3 = 0:3906. It is clear
that the trade resulting within the relationship 13 ultimately leads to ﬁnal consump-
tion levels given by
v1 = v3 = 1
2 (g1(13) + g3(13)) = 0:4403; and
m1 = m3 = 1
2 (h1(13) + h3(13)) = 0:4403:
This in turn leads to after-trade utility levels given by ^ u1 = ^ u3 = 0:4403 > 0:4375 =
u¤
1 = u¤
3. Hence, there are mutual gains from trade within the stable relationship
between individuals 1 and 3. ¤
4.2 The emergence of subjective specialization
Example 4.8 indicates that within a stable matching, there naturally emerges a mo-
derate level of trust and, consequently, the possibility of mutually beneﬁcial trade.
If such a stable matching is sustained, individuals will identify that specialization of
their skills leads to further deepening of the gains from trade. Indeed, after both
parties engage in trade, individual 1 will identify that increasing his skill level in
18hunting will increase his meat production further. Similarly, individual 3 will identify
the complementary effect of increasing her gathering skills to increase her vegetable
production.
This implies that further deepening of the stable trade relationship between indi-
viduals 1 and 3 results into mutual specialization. We emphasize that this speciali-
zation is induced at the most primitive level by the nature of the complementarities
between these individuals. Indeed, that individual 1 specializes in hunting is a con-
sequence of ®1
13 < ¯1
13. Hence, there are social foundations to this specialization;
specialization is still founded on the speciﬁc interaction within the relationship bet-
ween 1 and 3. In this regard this type of specialization is completely subjective; this
specialization only occurs within the context of the matching 13 and has no conse-
quences beyond that relationship.
Another formulation of the foundation of such subjective specialization is to say
that there are Ricardian comparative advantages for individual 1 to specialize in
hunting only within the context of the relationship between 1 and 3.12
Example 4.9 (Subjective specialization)
Consider the matching economy developed in Examples 4.7 and 4.8. Within the mat-
ching 13 both individuals now develop a deepening of their economic relationship.
As described in our previous discussion this ultimately leads to a moderate level of
trust and the development of subjective specialization; both individuals specialize
their production based on the environment of the matching 13 only.
Endogenous specialization under trade
Individual 1 considers the trade opportunities with individual 3 and consequently
optimizes her investment in the acquisition of gathering and hunting skills. Hence,
given the investment of individual 3 in the acquisition of gathering skills l3, indivi-
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This optimization problem is based on the trade opportunities emerging within the
matching 13. It is assumed that both individuals equally divide the gains from trade.






v3 ¢ m3 (9)
12For a comprehensive discussion we also refer, e.g., to Yang (2003, Chapter 3.2).
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i2
The reaction functions of players 1 and 3 for the values of the learning parameters
given in Example 4.7 are presented in Figure 2. The continuous line represents the
optimal investment in gathering skills by player 1 given the investment in gathering
skills by player 3 and similarly the dashed line represents the optimal investment
in gathering skills for player 3 given the investment of player 1. It is clear that
this mutual optimization problem has three solutions, namely the two cases of full
specialization: one in which player 1 specializes in gathering and player 3 in hunting
and the other in which player 1 specializes in hunting and player 3 in gathering; and
an equilibrium of relative specialization in which player 1 specializes relatively more
in gathering and player 3 specializes relatively more in hunting.13 Any of these three
solutions indicates a certain level of subjective specialization.
In the two extreme solutions given by (l1;l3) = (1;0) and (l1;l3) = (0;1), in which
both individuals fully specialize either gathering or hunting the attained utility levels
are u1 = u3 = 0:5. In the solution of relative specialization given by (l1;l3) =
(0:6;0:4) the attained utility levels are u1 = u3 = 0:4344. Clearly full specialization
leads to a higher attainable utility level.
13We can reformulate this in game theoretic terms. Indeed, individuals 1 and 3 engage in a two-player
normal form game with strategies l1 and l3 respectively. The two optimization problems formulate a
Nash equilibrium in this game. Thus, we identify three Nash equilibria in pure strategies for this
interaction game.
20Optimal subjective specialization
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By substituting the given parameter values for ® and ¯, there are two solutions na-
mely the solutions that correspond to full specialization identiﬁed by (l1;l3) = (1;0)
and (l1;l3) = (0;1). ¤
5 Objective specialization
The discussion in the previous section clariﬁes the emergence of stable matching pat-
terns and of subjective specialization. This emergence is essentially based on features
within the pattern of stable matchings. For an economy to have persistent access to
gains from specialization, the social structure of the economy has to generically ad-
mit stable matchings. Hence, whatever capabilities and desires of the individuals—
represented by their utility functions and (possibly) other individualistic features—a
stable matching pattern has to exist in the matching economy.
Technically, this brings up the question under which conditions on (N;¡) there
exists a stable matching pattern for every possible matching economy (N;¡;u), where
u is an arbitrary utility proﬁle. This line of research follows the research agenda set in
the matching literature. Here we are able to apply the main result of P´ apai (2004).14
Formally we deﬁne:
Deﬁnition 5.1 A pair (N;¡)—consisting of a set of individuals and a potential mat-
ching structure on that set—is generically stable if for every utility proﬁle u 2 U it
holds that ¦?(N;¡;u) 6= ?.
Our main existence theorem can now be stated as follows:
Theorem 5.2 The pair (N;¡) is generically stable if and only if the potential matching
structure ¡ is odd acyclic.
Proof.
If: From Deﬁnition 4.1 it follows that if ¡ is odd acyclic, then ¦w is odd acyclic too.
14Since our analysis is focused on matching patterns, we are able to provide less stringent sufﬁcient
condition for stability relative to P´ apai (2004).
21The sufﬁciency of odd acyclicity condition on the set of simple matching patterns for
the existence of a stable matching pattern follows from Theorem 4.5 directly applied
to Deﬁnition 5.1. This implies that odd acyclicity of ¡ is a sufﬁcient condition for the
existence of a stable matching pattern for any utility proﬁle u 2 U.
Only if: Suppose that there exists a stable matching pattern for all utility proﬁles
u 2 U. Next suppose to the contrary that the potential matching structure ¡ is not
odd acyclic. Without loss of generality, we may assume that ¡ contains a single odd
cycle C = fi1;i2;:::;ikg such that i1 = ik and k - 1 is an odd integer.
Take the utility proﬁle u 2 U such that uis(isis+1) > uis(is-1is) > uis(isis), for
all s = 1;:::;k - 1 where i0 = ik-1. In every weakly stable matching pattern
¼ 2 ¦w(u) with respect to the utility proﬁle u there is at least one individual, is
for s = 1;:::;k - 1, on the cycle ¡ who is relationally autarkic since there are
odd number of individuals in the cycle. Thus individual is can form a blocking
matching with individual is-1 since uis(is-1is) > uis(¼), i.e., every individual pre-
fers to be matched with another individual rather than be relationally autarkic, and
uis-1(is-1is) > uIs-1(¼) since individual is is the most preferred partner of individu-
al is-1 given preference proﬁle u. Thus, no stable matching pattern exists in ¡ with
respect to the given preference proﬁle u.
We now conclude that (N;¡) cannot be generically stable, which establishes a con-
tradiction. Hence, we have shown the assertion.
Theorem 5.2 provides a complete characterization of generically stable matching
structures. This is a very strong result with some deep consequences. Before dis-
cussing the consequences of this insight to the discussion of specialization, we turn
to the interpretation of the odd acyclicity property.
Theorem 5.3 Let ¡ be a potential matching structure on N. A sub-structure £ ½ ¡ is
odd acyclic if and only if (N;£) is bipartite in the sense that there exists a partitioning
fN1;N2g of N such that
£ n ¡0 ½ N1 ­ N2 = fij j i 2 N1 and j 2 N2 g: (10)
Proof. It is obvious that every bipartite structure £ on N is odd acyclic, since all
cycles have to be of even length. So, we only have to show the converse.
Let £ be odd acyclic on N. Without loss of generality we may assume that £ 6= ?,
£ \ ¡0 = ?, and that £ is completely connected in the sense that for all i;j 2 N with
i 6= j there is a path P(ij) ½ £ between i and j.
Select some i0 2 N. Assume that j 2 N is such that there exist two distinct paths
Pa = Pa(i0j) and Pb = Pb(i0j) between i0 and j. We now claim that the length of
both Pa as well as Pb are either odd or even. Indeed, if the length of Pa is odd and
the length of Pb is even, then Pa [ Pb ½ Theta deﬁnes a cycle from i0 to i0 that has
an odd length. This violates odd acyclicity of £.
22Now deﬁne N1 ½ N as follows: For every j 2 N we let j 2 N1 if and only if the unique
length of a path P(i0j) is odd. Subsequently we deﬁne N2 = N n N1, consisting of all
individuals that have paths of even length with i0.
Finally, we claim that for any ij 2 £ it holds that either i 2 N1 and j 2 N2 or j 2 N1
and i 2 N2. This follows immediately from the observation that for all i;j 2 N1 a
path P(ij) between them has to have even length. (Otherwise, there would be an
even- as well as an odd-length path between i0 and i.) Similarly, for all i;j 2 N2 a
path P(ij) between them has to have even length.
Theorem 5.3 states that odd acyclicity of a sub-structure of the potential matching
structure ¡ is equivalent to this sub-structure being bipartite. The latter refers to
familiar structures in matching theory (Roth and Sotomayor 1990) and imposes that
relations are only possible between individuals of a different, distinct “type”. We
develop an interpretation of this requirement in the next sections of this paper.
Our main insight provided in Theorem 5.2 can now be re-stated using the charac-
terization in Theorem 5.3:
Corollary 5.4 The potential matching structure (N;¡) is generically stable if and only
if (N;¡) is bipartite in the sense that there exists a partitioning fN1;N2g of N such that
¡ n ¡0 ½ N1 ­ N2 = fij j i 2 N1 and j 2 N2 g: (11)
We now turn to the discussion of the application of this insight to the economies with
skill complementarities developed in Examples 3.4, 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9.
As stated before, certain sets of skill complementarities might result into the emer-
gence of stable matching patterns. These stable matching patterns in turn give rise
to subjective specialization and mutually beneﬁcial trade. This does not mean that
there result widespread gains from trade. For such enhanced economic development
it is necessary that there emerges an objective or socially recognized division of labor.
In particular, we argue that the deepening of the stable matching patterns through
subjective specialization in turn leads to the emergence of odd acyclic structures of
potential matchings. This emergence is based on the social recognition of the roles
that are based on the subjective specialization of individuals in such stable matching
patterns. This is discussed in the next continuation of Examples 3.4–4.9.
Example 5.5 (Objective specialization)
Consider the stable matching pattern ¼¤ = f13;22g discussed extensively in Examples
4.7–4.9 as the unique stable matching pattern. Within this stable matching pattern,
the matching 13 is the only binary, value-generating relationship. In Example 4.8
it was sketched that within this relationship there would result trade opportunities
if sufﬁcient trust among the individuals 1 and 3 was established. Also, within this
matching, individual 1 generated a higher output of meat (h1(13) = 0:49) than of
23vegetables (g1(13) = 0:39) and individual 3 generated a higher output of vegetables
(g3(13) = 0:49) than of meat (h3(13) = 0:39) due to the actual values of the comple-
mentarity parameters ® and ¯.
Subsequently, in Example 4.9 we discussed the emergence of subjective specializa-
tion within the matching 13. We identiﬁed three different subjective specialization
conﬁgurations. The emergence of such subjective specialization was based on sufﬁ-
ciently high levels of trust and the presence of a trade relation between individuals 1
and 3.
At present we argue that further deepening of the efﬁciency in this economy is only
possible through the establishment of a true social division of labor. Given the initial
output levels, the subjective specialization will develop into the direction as indica-
ted through these output levels. Hence, individual 1 probably specializes subjectively
on hunting only, while individual 3 specializes subjectively on gathering only. If the-
se subjective specializations are recognized socially, individual 1 becomes a “hunter”
and individual 3 becomes a “gatherer”. Being a hunter now becomes a socially recog-
nized economic role, as does being a gatherer. Only after the establishment of these
social roles there emerges a social division of labor.
Now, the process of objectiﬁcation of subjective specialization induces the emergence
of (social) economic roles in a society. In the example discussed, players 1 and 3
can achieve social recognition as a gatherer and a hunter and re-evaluate their po-
tential utility level from a matching with another player. Now, let player 1 assume
the role of a gatherer and player 3 the role of a hunter. Subsequently, assume that
there emerge three social roles within this simple economy: H stands for a hunter,
G stands for a gatherer, and A stands for an individual in a position of autarky. The
assumed skill acquisition of each role is respectively GG = HH = 1, HG = GH = 0,
and GA = HA = 1
2. The production level of each potential matching is then given by:
ij gi(ij) hi(ij) gj(ij) hj(ij)
GG 1 0 — —
GA 1.3225 0 0.64 0.25
GH 1 0 0 1
AA 0.25 0.25 — —
AH 0.25 0.64 0 1.3225
HH 0 1 — —
In objective specialization each individual now expects to be trading when she en-
gages in a matching. Also, under objective specialization, unlike under subjective
specialization, the level of trust expands to the whole set of players, i.e., to the who-
le economy. This is why an individual believes fully that she can be matched with
another player with whom trade is beneﬁcial in a stable matching. In fact, there is
common knowledge that gatherers and hunters can be matched in highly productive
24social (trade) relationships. Individuals who assume social roles, have socially justi-
ﬁed beliefs that a stable matching pattern exists.
In our example, after objective specialization and the establishment of a social divi-
sion of labor, there emerge three types of individuals: hunters, gatherers and indivi-
duals in autarky. A hunter and a gatherer believe that they will exchange half a unit
of meat for half a unit of vegetables in a potential matching. The trade between a
hunter (or gatherer) and an individual in autarky will take the terms of 0.66125 units
of vegetables (meat) for 0.084235 units of meat (vegetables). These are calculated
to be the optimal trade patterns in the matchings AG and AH, respectively.
These production levels now result into the following potential utility levels after
trade:
j H G A
u(Hj) 0 0.5 0.2360
u(Gj) 0.5 0 0.2360
u(Aj) 0.4644 0.4644 0.25
.
Clearly, gatherers and hunters prefer to be engaged in a trade relation with each other
rather than to be in relation with an individual in autarky. Hence, returning to our
three person economy discussed in Examples 3.4–4.9, the unique stable matching
pattern can be identiﬁed as fGH;AAg, which corresponds to f13;22g in the original
setting. ¤
We argue that objective specialization excludes relationships between individuals
with the same social role as being potentially beneﬁcial economic matchings. This
implicitly reduces the potential matching structure to an odd acyclic or bipartite struc-
ture in which only matchings between individuals with two different roles are recog-
nized.
Finally, Theorem 5.2 does not guarantee the uniqueness of the stable matching
pattern that emerges in a matching economy. In order to establish uniqueness we
need to impose two additional restrictions on the potential matching structure, na-
mely that u 2 Us with Us ½ U being the set of all utility representations of strict
preferences only and that the potential matching structure ¡ is (fully) acyclic, i.e.,
also cycles with even number of links in the path are not allowed. This result is a di-
rect application of P´ apai (2004) uniqueness theorem and, hence, the proof is omitted
here.
Proposition 5.6 Let Us ½ U be the class of utility functions of strict preferences only.
Then, the potential matching structure (N;¡) is generically stable with j¦?(N;¡;u)j = 1
for all utility proﬁles u 2 Us if and only if ¡ is acyclic.
256 Concluding remarks
In this paper we introduced a four stage approach to the emergence of a social di-
vision of labor based on the objective specialization of individuals. As a ﬁfth stage
we can add the emergence of market institutions themselves. This approach clariﬁes
that the presence of a social division of labor is in fact a prerequisite for the creation
or emergence of a functioning price mechanism. Summarizing these four stages are:
Stage I: Non-equilibrium. In a primitive relational economy without objective spe-
cialization, there usually are conditions that do not support an equilibrium.
This leads to a situation in which all individuals are trade autarkic and in which
there is a state of permanent relational chaos. Individuals are fully self-reliant
for the provision of necessities for survival. Consequently, the generated level
of welfare is at the level of pure subsistence. Any additional utility generated
through interpersonal spillovers from social interaction are purely additional
beneﬁts to the generically low subsistence levels. (Example 3.4)
Stage II: Primitive equilibrium. Within a primitive relational economy there might
exist conditions that allow the emergence of a stable social interaction pattern.
Such a stable pattern is only founded on subjective and personal features, not
on any objective or social conditions.
Within this stage we distinguish two sub-stages.
(II-A) At ﬁrst there only emerges a stable pattern in which interpersonal spill-
overs are exploited. This ﬁrst level of stable social interaction facilitates the
emergence of a moderate level of subjective trust among the matched individu-
als. (Example 4.7)
(II-B) Next, the emergence of sufﬁcient subjective trust among the individuals
that are engaged with each other, supports the introduction of trade among tho-
se individuals; the exploitation of interpersonal spillovers is extended into the
trade of economic commodities leading to even higher levels of utilities. The
emergence of trade is an important step into the development of an economy.
(Example 4.8)
Stage III: Subjective specialization. After trade has been established there is the
possibility for a further deepening of interpersonal trust within the stable re-
lationships in the economy. This facilitates the emergence of subjective spe-
cialization in which individuals based on the demands of their interpersonal
relationships specialize their economic activities. Hence, within the context of
a stable trade relationship with other individuals, an individual chooses a pro-
duction plan to optimize his utility level.
This process of subjective specialization is similar to the specialization process
based on inframarginal analysis developed by Yang, e.g., Yang (2001) and Yang
26(2003),—as a formalization of the Smith-Young development mechanism—
within the context of a perfectly competitive price mechanism. However, sub-
jective specialization does not take place within the context of a functioning
price mechanism, but rather within the interpersonal relational setting of each
individual separately. (Example 4.9)
Stage IV: Objective specialization. The emergence of subjectively specialized indi-
viduals can lead to the recognition of social economic roles in the society at
large. Individuals who specialize on hunting skills in the context of their indivi-
dual relationships, become socially recognized as “hunters”. Thus, hunters are
identiﬁed and appointed in the society as producers of meat.
Subsequently, there emerge social rules related to the social role of a hunter
as a producer of meat. The engagement of a “hunter” with a “gatherer” in an
economically beneﬁcial (trade) relationship may thus become the foundation
for economic development. Individuals subsequently specialize in an objective
fashion: they now select from a limited set of social roles and engage in an ob-
jective fashion with other individuals in their respective social roles to generate
mutual economic beneﬁts.
It is only within this context of objective specialization that there emerges a so-
cial division of labor which further development acts as an engine for economic
growth—described in the context of a market by the Smith-Young mechanism.
(Example 5.5)
Stage V: Market emergence. We argue that only after the establishment of a social
division of labor based on the social recognition of certain economic roles, there
can emerge a functioning market or price mechanism. Besides the social divisi-
on of labor there have to be established numerous other economic institutions
such as the protection of property rights, monetary instruments, and the crea-
tion of actual market places. Only after these conditions have been met, there
might emerge a price mechanism through which further economic growth and
development is made possible in the form of the Smith-Young mechanism based
on the extent of the market.
In this paper we only have developed the most basic principles of this descriptive
theory. The main conclusion is that economic development and growth is closely
related to the development of the social roles in an economy. These social roles
have a public nature and as such are subject to a purely public economic theoretical
analysis or an evolutionary treatment. This is closely related to the conclusion in
Gilles and Diamantaras (2005).
Further development of the abstract theory of matching economies is required
before we can expect a full and working understanding of the ﬁve-stage process of
market development summarized above. This is the objective of future research.
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